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The Hunter Doctrine and Proposition 209: A
Reply to Thomas Wood
By VIKRAM DAVID AMAe* AND EVAN H. CAMINKR*
Introduction
Constitutional law should not be the exclusive province of lawyers for
one §imple and compelling reason: the Constitution is the "Supreme Law of
the Land" because "We the People"--not we the lawyers-understand and
continue to retain it. It is thus heartening at some level to see a non-lawyer
such as Mr. Wood take the time and effort to read complicated Supreme
Court cases, and to respond1 to our article2 analyzing them. In the end,
however, Mr. Wood fundamentally misreads and misunderstands the Supreme Court precedents most relevant to Proposition 209's constitutionality. Sometimes, Mr. Wood relies on words and phrases that do not appear
in the cases, and fails to account for specific straightforward language that
does appear and forecloses his approach.? At other times, Mr. Wood fails
to interpret words in the context of the entire decision in which they appear,
as well as in the context of the larger constitutional picture For these reasons, we continue to believe that a lower court, faithfully following Supreme Court precedent, should feel constrained to conclude that Proposition 209 runs afoul of equal protection.5
The argument against Proposition 209's constitutionality under existing law is premised on a line of Supreme Court cases which we call the
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; Visiting Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
** Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. The authors wish to thank
Alan Brownstein for his helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this reply.
1. See Thomas E. Wood, Does DecisionalLaw Grant Whites FewerPoliticalRights Under
the FourteenthAmendment Than it Grantsto RacialMinorities?:A Response to Vikram D. Amar
andEvanH. Caminker,24 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 969 (1997).
2. Vikram D. Amar and Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, UnequalPoliticalBurdens,
and the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q. 1019 (1996).
3. See infranotes 19-36, and accompanying text.
4. See infranotes 37-48, and accompanying text.
5. See generally Amar and Caminker, supra note 2. Whether or not the Supreme Court
would or should reaffirm the relevant precedents, the question we address concerning how to interpret and apply these precedents remains important even though the Ninth Circuit has rejected
their application to Proposition 209. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F. 3d 692
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 118 S.Ct. 397 (1997). The Ninth Circuit's reading of these cases is
not binding on any California court that entertains a constitutional challenge to 209, or on other
Circuits that might confront similar cases.
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Hunter doctrine.6 The two most important of these, for present purposes,
are Hunter v. Erickson7 and Washington v. Seattle School DistrictNo. 1.8
In Hunter, the citizens of Akron amended their city charter to require approval by a majority of Akron voters before any City Council ordinance
relating to racial or religious discrimination in real estate transactions could
go into effect9 The Supreme Court struck down the charter amendment as
violative of equal protection.10 The Court expressly declined to rest its
holding on a finding of invidious intent." Instead, the Court concluded that.
the law, on its face, drew an impermissible racial classification because it
treated "racial housing matters differently [and less favorably]" than other
matters.1 2 Although the charter amendment made no formal distinctions
between persons of different races, the Court found that the amendment
would uniquely disadvantage beneficiaries of antidiscrimination ordinances
(i.e., minorities), by forcing such ordinances to run a legislative gauntlet of
popular approval
from which other laws-and thus other interest groups3
were spared.1
The second case, Seattle, applied and extended Hunter. In response to
widespread defacto racial segregation in Seattle area schools, a few local
school districts adopted a race-conscious busing and pupil assignment plan
designed to eliminate racial imbalance. 14 These local programs prompted
the people of Washington to enact Initiative 350, which, as understood by
the Supreme Court, shifted local authority over racial busing to the state
legislature, while leaving intact local authority to engage in busing for any
other educationally valid reason. 15 The Supreme Court invalidated Initiative 350 on equal protection grounds, again declining to rest its holding on
a finding of invidious intent. 16 Instead, like the Akron charter amendment,
Initiative 350 was deemed flawed because it selectively removed a program
of particular importance to racial minorities-integrative busing-from a
level of decisionmaking that was more politically accessible for minorities

6. See Amar and Caminker, supranote 2, at 1024.
7. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
8. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). A third case upon which Mr. Wood relies is Crawfordv. Boardof
Education,458 U.S. 527 (1982). For an explanation why Crawforddoes not support Mr. Wood's
reading of the doctrine, see infra notes 49-59, and accompanying text. See also Amar and
Caminker, supranote 2, at 1049-53.
9. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. at 386 n.9.
10. See id. at 393.
11. See id.at389
12. Id.
13. See id.at390-91.

14. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 461.
15. See id. at 483.
16. See id. at 487.
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(local school districts) to a level that was more remote and less accessible

(the state legislature).17
As we read the cases, a person challenging a law under the Hunter
doctrine must satisfy a two-part test. First, she must show that the law in
question is "racial" or "racial in character," in that it singles out for special
treatment issues that are particularly associated with racial minority interests. Second, she must show that the law imposes an unfair political process burden by entrenching resolution of such "racial matters" in a political
process where minorities are less able to succeed. Strict scrutiny is triggered only if the challenger satisfies both parts of the test. A law that imposes special political process burdens on classes not defined by race does
not directly implicate the caselaw. Similarly, a law that deals selectively
with "racial" issues but does not impose a political disadvantage upon minority interests is unproblematic. For example, the simple repeal of a specific antidiscrimination ordinance or affirmative action program would be
entirely permissible.
Under this framework, Proposition 209 seems vulnerable. As we previously wrote:
[Proposition 209] singles out race and treats it differently from any other
criterion for public employment, education and contracting decisions. In
doing so, [Proposition 209] isolates an issue of special interest to minorities-affirmative action programs designed to remedy past racial wrongs
and bring minorities together with nonminorities in educational and vocational settings-and relegates this issue to the highest and most entrenched
s level of governmental decisionmaking, the California Constitution.i

I. Mr. Wood's Proposed Process-Substance Distinction
Mr. Wood's basic quarrel with our reading of the cases concerns the
second prong of the two-part test described above. According to Mr.
Wood's reading of the Hunter and Seattle cases, they cast constitutional
doubt only on measures that single out racial matters and explicitly alter or
restructure the political decisionmaking process as to those racial matters. 19
The fact that a law enacting a substantive policy has the effect of moving
racial matters, and racial matters alone, to a higher and more remote level
of political decisionmaking does not make the law constitutionally vulner17. See id.at485.
18. Amar and Caminker, supranote 2, at 1021.
19. See Wood, supranote 1, at 970 ("Mhe Seattle ruling invalidates only those enactments
that meet both of the following criteria: (1) the enactment addresses a racial matter;, and (2) it ex-

plicitly alters a political decisionmaldng process on that racial matter in a way that places a special burden on minorities.") (emphasis added).
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able, so long as the process-restructuring aspect of the law is not explicit on
the law's face.20
We previously acknowledged that such a process-substance distinction
has surface plausibility as a defense of Proposition 209.21 Granted, Proposition 209 is less explicit in its restructuring of the political process than the
Akron Charter amendment or Initiative 350. Nevertheless, for a variety of
reasons, most of which Mr. Wood does not mention let alone address, we
do "not believe that a proce[ss]-substance distinction
provides a viable and
22
principled limitation on the Hunter doctrine."
To begin with, Mr. Wood's repeated references to a requirement of an
explicit alteration of political processes comes from his own language, not
the Court's. Mr. Wood writes as if the Court expressly stated that a process
restructuring must be explicit in order for a plaintiff to have a constitutional
claim. For instance, he says that Proposition 209 must be distinguishable
from Seattle if "the phrase 'explicitly alters the political decisionmaking
process' is to have any meaning. 23 Perhaps this is true, but the phrase
"explicitly alters the decisionmaking process" does not appear in Seattle or
Hunter at all; the phrase belongs to Mr. Wood, not to the Court.2 4
Moreover, the proffered distinction seems unrelated to the central
conceptual inquiry underlying Hunter and Seattle. Had the cases been concerned with invidious intent, then the explicitly procedural wording of an
initiative might be relevant insofar as it betrays an illicit motive. But the
cases expressly eschew emphasis on intent in the traditional sense.25 Instead, Hunter and Seattle focus primarily and repeatedly on effective access
20. Most if not all of Mr. Wood's criticisms of our argument come back to this explicit procedural alteration/substantive policy distinction. See, e.g., id. at 970; ido
at 971-72 (Seattle is distinguishable from 209 because "the people of the State of Washington did not adopt a [substantive] anti-busing policy when they passed Initiative 350" and because "initiative 350 explicitly
altered the state's political decisionmaking process on a particular issue.") (emphasis added).
21. See Amar and Caminker, supranote 2, at 1046.
22. Id.
23. Wood, supra note 1, at 975; see also id at 978 ("IThere are a priori reasons for not
interpreting the phrase 'explicitly alters the political decisionmaking structure' too broadly." Id.)
24. The Court does say its concerns are triggered when a State allocates governmental power
non-neutrally, by "explicitly using the racialnature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking
process." See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 470 (emphasis in original); see also Crawford,458 U.S. at 551
(Marshall J.,
dissenting) (quoting same from Seattle). But in this sentence, the word "explicitly"
modifies the phrase, "use[s] the racial nature," not the phrase, "determinefs] the decisionmaking
process." In fact, in each and every instance where the Court in Hunter, Seattle, or Crawforduses
either the word "explicit" or "explicitly," the term is used to modify the adjective "racial," and
never to modify a verb such as "alter," "restructure," or "determine" the decisionmaking process.
See Hunter,393 U.S. at 389 ("Here, unlike Reitman, there is an explicitly racial classification");
Seattle, 458 U.S. at 485 (the Huntercharter amendment dealt with legislation in "explicitly racial
terms"); id.
at 485 n. 28 (strict scrutiny is applied to "explicit racial classifications"); Crmvford,
458 U.S. at 536 (plaintiffs contend that Proposition I is an "explicit racial classification").
25. See, e.g., Seattle, 458 U.S. at 485; see also Amar and Caminker, supranote 2, at 1046.
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question.2 6

to political power by the minority groups in
This effects/intent
difference becomes clear when one compares the Hunter doctrine with the
Washington v. Davis27 line of equal protection cases. Washington addresses a distinct equal protection doctrine that Mr. Wood does not discuss,
but which is part of the larger equal protection landscape that necessarily
shapes the inquiry. And the process-substance distinction is beside the
point if effects, rather than intent, drive the Hunter doctrine.
Putting such nuance aside, the most obvious reason we rejected the
process-substance distinction is that the Court in Seattle rejected it.2 s As
we explained, footnote 17 of Justice Blackmun's majority opinion demonstrates that the Seattle Court regarded the process-substance distinction as
constitutionally unimportant. Mr. Wood, however, finds "it difficult to understand why"2 9 we rely on this footnote. We therefore return to the heart
of it. In footnote 17, the Court stated:
Hunter would have been virtually identical to [the law struck down in
Seattle] had the Akron charter amendment simply barred the City Council fom passing any fair housing ordinance.... Surely, however, Hunter
would not have come out the other way had the charter amendment made
no provision for the passage of fair housing legislation, instead of subjecting such legislation to ratification by referendum 3
In other words, if the Akron charter amendment provided only that
"the City Council shall not enact any fair housing ordinance," it would
have run afoul of equal protection just as much as the charter amendment
actually struck down, which provided in essence that "the City Council
shall not enact any fair housing ordinance, unless the ordinance goes
through the procedure of popular approval." The hypothetical charter
amendment which makes no mention of a popular approval procedure is
nothing more than a substantive enactment of a policy against fair housing
laws-it would not explicitly restructure any procedures--and yet the Court
stated that it would strike such an amendment down?'

26. See, e.g., Amar and Caminker, supranote 2, at notes 41-52, 76-82 and accompanying
text; Hunter,393 U.S. at 391; Seattle, 458 U.S. at 472,476,486; Crawford,458 U.s. at 537.
27. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
28. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at474-75 n.17.
29. Wood, supranote 1, at 982.
30. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474-75 n.17.
31. The Court's rejection of a process-substance distinction here makes eminent sense. To
appreciate this easily, imagine that the Akron charter amendment had subjected all fair housing
laws not to a popular approval requirement, but rather to a City Council supermajority requirement (60%). Mr. Wood would surely agree that this would violate the Hunter doctrine. Imagine
fIrther an even higher supermajority requirement (90%). Same result. Now imagine a Council
unanimity requirement (100%). Clearly the same result Next imagine a higher bar still-an absolute ban on fair housing ordinances even if the Council is unanimous. It is not hard to see why
permitting this highest (absolute) bar, while invalidating lower bars would make little sense in
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This reasoning extends to Proposition 209. Just as the Court's hypothetical Akron charter amendment prohibiting fair housing ordinances outright violates the Hunter doctrine because it effectively withdraws policymaking power to the most remote level-the People of Akron32-- so also
does 209 violate Hunter by effectively withdrawing policy-making power
to the most remote level-the People of California.33
Mr. Wood might respond to this equation by labeling the Court's hypothetical charter amendment "procedural" because it targets an entitythe City Council-and its power to make certain racial policies. But Proposition 209 is "procedural" in precisely this same way-it targets "the State"
(which is defined as including all cities, counties, and other public entities)
and its powers to make certain racial policies. For this reason, Mr. Wood
cannot distinguish the Court's own hypothetical, which the Court said was
unconstitutional, from Proposition 209.
Similarly, Mr. Wood's attempt to distinguish between Initiative 350
and Proposition 209 along a process-substance dimension further reveals
the fragile nature of the proffered distinction. Mr. Wood argues as follows:
[T]he people of the State of Washington did not adopt an anti-busing
policy when they passed Initiative 350. Indeed, as the Seattle Court itself
noted, the measure left the state legislature free to order such busing.
Proposition 209, on the other hand, is a substantive policy enacted at the
highest level of state government the constitution. As with virtually all
state constitutional amendments, its prohibitions are 4controlling over all
non-federal entities and instrumentalities in the state.3
It is difficult to see analytically why 350 qualifies as procedural rather
than substantive merely because the state legislature could, if it wanted, engage in racial busing itself. Initiative 350, like 209, expressed antipathy for
particular race-conscious policies and, at the time of the Initiative's enactment, left Washington devoid of such policies. It is true (1) that the controversial race-conscious programs at issue in Washington had been
adopted by local governments, so that these local entities were naturally the
target of busing's opponents; 35 (2) that the situation is different in California, where the controversial race-conscious programs at issue have been
maintained by both local and state governmental units; and (3) that Proposition 209 naturally targets both. But none of this means that 350 should be
considered less "substantive" and more "procedural." A policy is no less
terms of the values underlying the Hunterdoctrine. And yet this anomalous result, already fore-

closed by the Court, is exactly what Mr. Wood urges.
32. They are the only ones who can still use their sovereign power to make fair housing laws.
33. They are the only ones who can still use their sovereign power to make affirmative action

laws.
34. Wood, supra note 1, at 971-72.

35. See id.
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"substantive" merely because it can be changed by the legislature in the
future. Proposition 209's policy can also be changed in the future-by the
voters of California. And this (clear but unstated) possibility of amendment surely does not, in Mr. Wood's eyes, render Proposition 209 any less
substantive. The simple fact is that in both Washington and California,
certain state entities (the state legislature and the state electorate in Washington, and the state electorate in California) could still, even after the respective initiatives, implement controversial race-conscious policies in the
future (though subordinate governmental units could not). Accordingly,
just as 209 cannot be distinguished on process-substance grounds from the
hypothetical (and unconstitutional) Akron charter amendment posited by
the Court; neither can it be meaningfully distinguished on processsubstance grounds from the invalidated Initiative 350.
The fatal flaw in a process-substance distinction can be illuminated by
one final hypothetical. Suppose that Proposition 209 said "No unit of state
government shall enact any race-consciousness law, unless the raceconscious law is approved by a majority of the state electorate through a
constitutionalinitiative." Even Mr. Wood would have to concede that this
version of Proposition 209 is, by his own definition, procedural because it
explicitly changes the level of state government at which race-conscious
laws can be made. Why should this version be any more unconstitutional
than the version
of 209 actually enacted, which in effect does precisely the
36
same thing?
II. Thomas Wood on Harry Blackmun on Lewis Powell
Mr. Wood next argues that we must read Seattle to recognize a process-substance distinction because that is the only way to make sense of another footnote, footnote 23 of Justice Blackmun's Seattle majority opinion.
Mr. Wood reads footnote 23 as specifically declaring statewide efforts to
eliminate local governments' race-conscious programs to be permissible,

36. It is noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit, in rejecting a Seattle-basedchallenge to Proposition 209, did not seize on the process-substance distinction embraced by Mr. Wood. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) cert denied, 118 S.Ct. 397
(1997). Instead, the Ninth Circuit for the most part resisted Seattle's logic itself-labeling as
"paradoxical" the notion that a law eliminating race consciousness could ever be considered a racil classification. See CoalitionforEcon. Equity, 122 F.3d at 709. The Ninth Circuit did try to
distinguish Seattle from 209 on the ground that racial busing is a sui generis kind of raceconscious
affirmative action. See id. at 708 n.16. Although this is obviously not the place to fuly

critique the Ninth Circuit opinion, for the record we think that lower courts should not ignore Supreme Court reasoning they find "paradoxical," and that the distinction between racial busing and
other race-conscious programs does not survive close scrutiny.
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interpreting laws like Proposition 209 to be constitutional.37 Mr. Wood,
however, misreads footnote 23; it does not constitutionally bless laws like
209 and has nothing to do with any process-substance distinction.
Because footnote 23 is a response to Justice Powell's dissent his argument should first be considered. Justice Powell did raise some concerns
about the scope of the majority opinion:
Under its holding the people of the State of Washington apparently are
forever barred from developing a different policy on mandatory busing
where a school district previously has adopted one of its own. This principle would not seem limited to the question of mandatory busing. Thus,
if the admissions committee of a state law school developed an affirmative-action plan that came under fire, the Court apparently would find it
unconstitutional for any higher authority to intervene... After today's
decision it is unclear whether the State may set policy in any area of race
relations where a local governmental body arguably has done ' more"
than the Fourteenth Amendment requires. If local employment or benefits are distributed on a racial basis to the benefit of racial minorities, the
State apparently may not thereafter ever intervene.38
Mr. Wood is correct that in footnote 23 the majority denied Justice
Powell's assertion that under the Seattle rationale a state could never intervene in local policies.3 9 But Mr. Wood's suggestion that the Court meant
that a state may always thereafter intervene in local decisionmaking, including through a measure like Proposition 209, flies in the face of the
Court's own explanation.
In simple terms, Justice Powell said: "the Court's opinion would mean
a state can never intervene in local decisionmaking," to which the Court responded, "That's not true." Mr. Wood reads this response to mean: "That's
not true-a state may always intervene." But the Court's response could
just as well be read: "That's not true; a state may sometimes intervene, depending on the manner." Powell's fear that intervention will always be
foreclosed is unwarranted because, according to the Court, a state may intervene in
some circumstances, i.e., so long as it does so "in a race-neutral
40
manner.
37. See Wood, supra note 1, at 974,985.
dissenting).
38. 458 U.S. at 498 n.14 (Powell, J.,
39. See Wood, supranote 1,at 985.
40. 458 U.S. at 480 n.23 (majority opinion) (emphasis added), responding to 458 U.S. at 498
n.14 (Powell, J.,dissenting). Mr. Wood's claim that our reading must be rejected as a "purely
lifiguistic matter," Wood, supranote 1, at 986, rests on a distortion of the dialogue. Mr. Wood

argues as follows:
If X is asked whether Y has the authority to adopt a policy on a particular subject-matter
that preempts contrary policies by lower levels of govemment and X replies that Y does
have such authority, it would be unusual to interpret that affirmative answer to mean
that Y may do so but only if Y also reserves decisionmaking authority on all other matters.
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This narrower reading of the Court's rejection of Powell's concern is
the better reading for two reasons. First, it makes the most sense of the text
of the Court's footnote itself. The Court's response to Powell is worth
quoting in full:
Throughout his dissent, Justice POWELL insists that the Court has created a "vested constitutional right to local decisionmaking," that under
our holding "the people of the State of Washington apparently are forever barred from developing a different policy on mandatory busing
where a school district previously has adopted one of its own," and that
today's decision somehow raises doubts about "the authority of a State to
abolish school boards altogether' These statements evidence a basic
misunderstanding of our decision. Our analysis vests no rights, and has
nothing to do with whether school board action predates that taken by the
State. Instead, what we find objectionable about Initiative 350 is the
comparative burden it imposes on minority participation in the political
process-that is, the racialnature of the way in which it structures the
process ofdecisionmaking. It is evident, then, that the horribles paraded
by the dissent-which have nothing to do with the ability of minorities to
participate in the process of self-government--are entirely unrelated to
this case. It is equally clear, as we have noted at severalpoints in our
opinion, that the State remainsfree to vest all decisionmakingpower in
state officials, or to4 remove
authorityfrom local school boards in a
1
race-neutralmanner.

As the highlighted language makes clear, Justice Powell's contention
that under the majority's approach a state may not override local policy
choices is sometimes false. A state may develop a different statewide policy, provided that the policy results in a neutral (i.e., not race-specific) reallocation of decisionmaking power. For example, the state may "intervene" to terminate local race-conscious programs in public contracting by
declaring a state policy to award contracts to the "lowest responsible bidder.! 42 Such a contracting policy is race-neutral in that it dictates criteria
for selection, rather than singling out race as a uniquely impermissible
grounds for preference. Similarly, the state may "intervene" to terminate
racial preferences in employment or law school admissions by affirmatively
Id. Perhaps Mr. Wood is correct that a blanket "yes" generally does not mean "yes, but." The
actual dialogue between Blackmun and Powell, however, does not track the structure of Mr.
Wood's hypothetical question and answer session. Powell never "asked" the Court a question to
which the Court responded with a blanket "yes." Instead, Powell stated that Y (a State or its People) lacked authority to adopt a particular policy, and Blackmun (X) replied "no, that statement is
false." Given the structure of this dialogue, X's "no" can mean either"no, Y can always, rather
than never adopt the policy" (Wood's reading) or "no, Y can sometimes, rather than never, adopt
the policy" (our reading). No linguistic rule or convention privileges the former reading over the
latter.
41. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 480 n.23 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
42. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 616 F.2d
1381 (9th Cir. 1980).
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defining some meritocratic criteria, rather than by uniquely prohibiting
preferences based on race.4 3 Such race-neutral intervention "where a local
governmental body arguably has done 'more' than the Fourteenth Amendment requires,"4 4 is perfectly consistent with the rule of Hunter and Seattle.
But the state may not intervene in a manner that imposes a "comparative
burden ...on minority participation in the political process" by using "the
racial nature" of a problem to "restructurelil the process of decisionmak-

ing.,
Second, our reading of footnote 23 is the only one that is consistent
with the rest of the Court's opinion. As the Court explains over and over,
the Hunter doctrine's "simple but central principle '46 is that a state is free
to "allocat[e] political power according to 'neutral principles' [even though
this] may 'make it more difficult for minorities to achieve favorable legislation,"'4 7 but the state cannot "'differentiate[] between the treatment of
problems involving racial matters and that afforded other problems in the
same area."' 48 By contrast, Mr. Wood's reading would require us to believe that the Supreme Court, in a single footnote, meant to take back virtually everything else it repeatedly said in the text-and in a way that leaves
the result 'inSeattle completely unexplained and perhaps inexplicable.
Conventional rules of interpretation preclude such a reading.
MI.

The Limited Relevance of Crawford

Moving from Seattle footnotes to other opinions, Mr. Wood also seeks
support from Crawfordv.BoardofEducation.49 In that case, the Court upheld California's Proposition I, which removed state law obligations on
pilblic entities to use busing to integrate California schools beyond the requirements imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 50 In our earlier article,

43. We do not mean to suggest that under our approach, the only way for a state to intervene
would be to specify a full set of permissible criteria. A state could permissibly eliminate race
preferences along with a host of other preferences, instead of prescribing affirmative criteria to be
used. While tough line drawing questions about how many other kinds of preferences must be
included along with race to make a law permissible certainly arise, this "how general is general
enough?" question is not unique to the Hunter doctrine, and instead runs through much of equal
protectionjurisprudence. Suffice it to say that the Akron charter amendment, Initiative 350, and
Proposition 209 all present easy cases in this regard, in that they are so race-specific and thus--to
use the Court's tern--'non-neutral:'
44. Seattle,458 U.S. at 498 n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
45. i at480n.23.
46. Id. at 469.

47. Id at 470 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 480 (citation omitted).
49. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
50. See Crawford,458 U.S. at 527.
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we (like the Crawfordcourt itself) distinguished Crawford from Seattle by
pointing out that even after Proposition I, state and local governments in
California were not disempowered from adopting busing programs beyond
those required by the federal Constitution.51 Proposition I simply removed
state constitutional obligationson state and local government to use busing
beyond federal requirements.
Mr. Wood acknowledges that the Crawford Court distinguished Seattle in this way, but simply asserts that even had Proposition I disempowered
state and local government from engaging in racial busing, Proposition I
would have been upheld. 5 2 He concludes by analogy that Proposition 209
should be upheld as well.
Mr. Wood appears to argue as follows: In the course of its opinion, the
Crawford Court observed that even after Proposition I, California's Constitution went beyondwhat the federal Constitution requires by giving local
school boards the power to engage in busing beyond that required by the'
federal Constitution. 3 If giving local government power to engage in such
racial busing goes beyond federal constitutional requirements, then, as a
logical matter, preservation of that local power certainly cannot be required
by anything in the federal Constitution. In Mr. Wood's words, when California, 'through Proposition 209, eliminates state and local race-conscious
programs, it "recede[s] from something that the Federal Constitution does
not require, and no more. ' 54 Mr. Wood's argument rests on faulty reading
and reasoning, and is thus both descriptively and normatively incorrect.
As a descriptive matter, Mr. Wood fundamentally mischaracterizes the
Crawford Court's statements concerning the relationship of state and federal law after Proposition I. The CrawfordCourt did observe that even after
Proposition I, the California Constitution went beyond federal requirements, but not because the California Constitution authorizedstate and local government to act affirmatively. Instead, California law went beyond
federal constitutional requirements in that it obligated local government to
take certain steps that were not federally required. The passage Mr. Wood
himself quotes makes this clear:
Even after Proposition I, the California Constitution still imposes a
greater duty of desegregation than does the Federal Constitution. The
state courts of California continue to have an obligation under state law
to order segregated school districts to [remedy de facto, as opposed to de
51. See Amar and Caminker, supra note 2, at 1052; Crawford,458 U.S. at 536 n.12.
52. See Wood, supra note 1, at 993.
53. This is Wood's key point. He asserts, "the Court regarded the power that school boards
retainedunder Proposition I as a feature of the measure that went beyond anything requiredby
the FederalConstitution." Wood, supranote 1, at 993-94 (emphasis added).

54. Wood, supranote 1, at 994.
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jure segregation.] The school districts themselves retain a state-law obligation to take reasonably feasible [non-busing] steps to55 desegregate, and
they remain free to adopt busing plans [if they choose.]
There is an obvious difference between duty to act and power to act,
and when the Court speaks of California law going beyond federal law, it
does so in terms of the "duty of desegregation" imposed by the California
Constitution and the "obligations" imposed by state law on local government. It is true that the last clause of the last sentence of the quoted passage refers to power-as opposed to duty--on the part of state and local
government. But read in context, this language is simply part of the more
general point that the Court is making in this passage: that Proposition I did
not eschew a federally required duty-which by definition would violate
the federal Constitution--because Proposition I still imposed a greater
"duty of desegregation than does the federal Constitution."
As a normative matter, Mr. Wood is wrong in suggesting that a state
may prohibit a particular local power with impunity because, in so doing, it
merely "recede[s] from something that the Federal Constitution does not
require, and no more." 57 Whether a state may prohibit a particular local
power consistent with the federal Constitution depends on how the state
does it. For example, a state has no duty to offer its residents welfare benefits, and thus a state law precluding local government welfare programs
would merely "recede[] from something that the Federal Constitution does
not require." But a state law precluding local governments from providing
welfare to racial minorities would "do more"--it would draw an unlawful
racial classification. Here also, Proposition 209 "do[es] more" than recede
from preference programs that the federal Constitution does not require; it
recedes from them selectively in a manner violative of equal protection.
Only this reasoning explains how the Court in Crawford could distinguish the opposite result it reached in Seattle. In Crawford, the Court
properly interpreted Proposition I as a "mere repeal" of an unusually broad
interpretation of the State Constitution's equal protection clause. This repeal was made by the entity that had enacted the clause (the People of California). The Crawford Court explained that "the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has
58
been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification."
By contrast, the Court said that Initiative 350, at issue in Seattle, was more
than a mere repeal by the enacting entity-and was thus constitutionally
problematic-in that it placed a special burden on minorities by disempow55. Crawford,458 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added); see Wood, supranote 1, at 994.
56. Crawford,458 U.S. at 541.

57. Wood, supranote 1, at 994.
58. Crawford,458 U.S. at 539 (emphasis added).
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ering local government from enacting desegregation programs.59 Proposition 209, like Initiative 350 and unlike Proposition I, disempowers state and
local government in a non-neutral way and is thus constitutionally problematic.--------------------------------....

IV. Equal Protection Symmetry
At the end of the day, Mr. Wood is reduced to suggesting that our
reading of the cases gives non-whites more equal protection rights than
those enjoyed by whites. 60 This charge is somewhat confusing, since it is
equally applicable to Hunter and Seattle as he interprets them, and yet he
claims to believe these cases were rightly decided. 6 ' In any event, the
charge is also misleading. The Hunter doctrine does not protect non-whites
more than whites because of their race per se, but rather because of their
numerical minority status, their history of oppression and their lack of political power. The same is true of the Supreme Court's affirmative action
doctrine announced recently in Croson62 and Adarand 3 Under these recent cases, all facial racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of what race is burdened. But the Court has made clear that the
facially symmetrical strict scrutiny test plays out asymmetrically across racial groups because laws that explicitly disadvantage minority races are
much less likely to survive strict scrutiny than laws that explicitly aid minority races.! It just so happens that in California today, as in the rest of
the country, eliminating race consciousness means eliminating only programs that help persons of color, because racial preferences for white persons cannot currently satisfy strict scrutiny. Thus the asymmetry of which
Mr. Wood complains is not inherent in the formal doctrine, but it is inherent in the history and nature of racial oppression that the Court, quite properly, continues to find relevant to the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-

59. See supranote 51, and accompanying text.
60. He does this in the title of his piece itself (a part of the title being, Does DecisionalLaw
Grant Whites Fewer PoliticalRights Underthe FourteenthAmendment Than It Grantsto Racial
Minorities?)
61. Indeed, in his own description of Seattle's two-part test, Mr. Wood explains that a law is

not vulnerable unless it explicitly alters the process "in a way that places a special burden on minorities." Wood, supranote 1, at 970 (emphasis added). Thus, a state constitutional amendment
that explicitly altered the political process as to racial issues in a way thatfavored minority interests (for example, by insulating local racial busing from any state intervention-even race-neutral
intervention) would not give Mr. Wood pause. Given his concession that Seattle is about protecting minorities, much of Mr. Wood's argument is hard to understand.
62. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
63. Adarand Constructionv. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
64. See, e.g., Adarand,115 S.Ct. at2114.
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ment. This asymmetry fulfills, rather than frustrates, the core values of the
Equal Protection Clause.

